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MUTUAL FuNDs - CAPITAl. GAINs DISTRIBUTIONS TREATED AS PRINCIPAL
UNDER THE UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT. - Alice Brock, the testatrix,
died September 14, 1939. By her will, she created a perpetual trust of her
residuary estate. She directed that certain fixed sums, totaling $18,700, be paid
annually from the trust income to seven primary beneficiaries; any trust income
in excess of this amount be paid annually to two secondary beneficiaries; and
any income released from the trust, by the death or deaths of any, and finally all,
of the primary and secondary beneficiaries, be paid forever in equal shares to
Bryn Mawr College and the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts. The
annual income from this trust presently 'exceeds $18,700; the excess being paid
to the appellant income beneficiary. On September 3, 1964, the trustees pur-
chased seven shares of the capital stock of Philadelphia Fund, Inc. (hereinafter
Fund), a mutual fund and regulated investment company. On September 30,
1964, the trsstees received from the Fund a distribution of $1.05. The authoriz-
ing resolution of the Fund described this distribution as a quarterly distribution
of 7 cents per share out of ordinary net income and 8 cents per share payable
from realized capital gains. The resolution further provided for payment of
such distribution in cash or additional shares of stock, at the option of the re-
ceiving stockholders. The trustees elected to receive payment in cash and re-
ceived 49 cents designated "ordinary net income" and 56 cents designated "re-
alized capital gains." The trustees then filed an account in the Orphans' Court
of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, wherein the entire distribution of $1.05 was
allotted to income. Bryn Mawr College fied objections to this allocation on the
ground that the amount of distribution from "realized capital gains" should be
distributed to principal. The Orphans' Court sustained Bryn Mawr's objection.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Judge Roberts dissenting, affirmed and
held: a distribution made by a mutual fund or regulated investment company,'
the source of which distribution is "realized capital gains," is properly allocable
to principal under section 5(3) rather than section 5(1) of the Pennsylvania
Principal and Income Act of 1947.2 In re Brock, 420 Pa. 454, 218 A.2d 281
(1966).
A typical mutual fund is an open-end diversified management investment
company.' Its business is to select, buy, hold, and sell corporate stocks and other
securities.4 The fund's income is twofold. It derives income from interest and
dividends on the securities in its portfolio and gains or profits from advantageous
1 Hereinafter "mutual funds" will mean a regulated investment company under the
Investment 'Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789-847, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5 (1964). The Pennsylvania statute is substantially the
same as the UnForat PmNCIPAL AND INcomE AcT § 5 (1931).
3 [The fund is called] "open-end" because the capital of the fund grows with each
new share sold and issued, and declines with each share redeemed. "Diversified"
because fund investments are not heavily concentrated in individual issues. '"Ianage-
ment" because the investments are not fixed, nor are they alterable only under rigidly
defined conditions. "Companies" as a generic term to include trusts or other legal
forms a fund can assume.
Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. Rav. 181, 182 n.3 (1961).
4 Lovett Estate (No. 2), 78 Pa. D. & C. 21, 24 (Orphans' Ct. 1951).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
sales of its securities.5 This income, after deduction of management fees, is
distributed to the stockholders in two distinct dividends - cash and capital gains.'
The confusion presently begirding this area of dividend allocation has
been caused, to a large extent, by the unique nature of a mutual fund. The
principal issue is whether a mutual fund is analogous to an ordinary business
corporation (a separate entity) or to a common trust fund (a mere conduit).
The resolution of this issue is crucial. Under the separate entity theory, sales of
securities by a mutual fund are treated as sales from inventory, and thus the
gains from such sales are ordinary income to the trust allocable to the life income
beneficiary. Under the conduit theory, however, such gains are treated as re-
turns of capital and are thus allocable to principal, in the same manner as if
the trustee had invested directly rather than through a mutual fund intermediary.7
judge Roberts, in his dissent in Brock, argued that the conduit theory was
inapplicable and that mutual fund distributions should be governed by the
separate entity theory. The basic thesis of the separate entity theory is that the
portfolio securities of a mutual fund are inventory or stock in trade.' In Lovett
Estate (No. 2),' the Orphand Court of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, stated:
The portfolio assets of an investment company are not regarded as
permanent assets of fixed capital by the managers of the company; the
securities held are treated by the managers as funds to be turned over in
the normal management of the business. Selling a portfolio asset is but
a normal incident of the business. The managers of an investment com-
pany must: (1) select, (2) buy, (3) hold, (4) sell various issues of securities
and stock, depending on market trend, price, indicated earnings, dividend
potentials and other factors, in short, they "buy the market." The gain
resulting from turning over of any portfolio asset by an investment company
is income occurring in the ordinary conduct and course of such business. 10
The "stock in trade" view is substantiated by the balance sheets of a mutual
fund. Mutual funds carry their portfolio assets at market value rather than cost,
a practice rarely used'in the case of capital assets.' This concept of mutual funds
as traders in securities, with the portfolio as its stock in trade, has been followed
by courts in several jurisdictions. 2
5 See Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 511 (1964).
6 A mutual fund must designate its dividends as either income or capital gains. 54 Stat.
821, 15 U.S.O. § 80a-19 (1964). The fund cannot offset investment losses (capital losses)
against investment income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 852 (a) (1).
7 Note, Trusts - Mutual Funds - Allocation of Capital Gains Distributions, 18 Sw.
L.J. 508, 510 (1964).
8 See BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 858 (2d ed. 1962); Young, A Dissent on
Capital Gain Distributions, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 280 (1949).
9 78 Pa. D. & C. 21 (Orphans' Ct. 1951).
10 Id. at 24.
11 See Cohan and Dean, Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Fiduciary Apportionment
of Stock Proceeds: The Non-Statutory Pennsylvania Rules, 106 U. PA. L. Rav. 157, 182-83
(1957); Young, supra note 8.
12 In Rosenburg v. Lombardi, 222 Md. 346, 160 A.2d 601, 604 (Ct. App. 1960), the
court quoted with approval Lovett Estate (No. 2), 78 Pa. D. & C. 21, 24 (Orphans' Ct.
1951): "Selling a portfolio asset is but a normal incident in the business." This view was
concurred in by 74 HARV. L. R-v; 796 (1961). In In re Gardner's Trust, 266 Minn. 127,
144, 123 N.W.2d 69, 80 (1963), the court said, "In other words, the'securities held which
are bought and sold in the normal course of business of an investment company constitute
... its stock in trade." Briel v. Moody, 77 N.J. Super. 306, 186 A.2d 314 (Super. Ct. 1962).
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The argument in favor of the conduit theory, advanced by the majority in
Brock, is a persuasive one."3 The conduit theory focuses on the substance, rather
than the form, of a mutual fund's activities. This theory views the investor,
rather than the mutual fund, as the real party in interest. Such a view is sub-
stantiated by the method of evaluating mutual fund shares. The shares are
evaluated as if each stockholder owned a pro rata share of the portfolio.' 4 Thus,
an investment in a mutual fund is, in substance, the same as if the shareholder
had invested the amount of his pro rata share in securities directly. The mutual
fund is held to be a mere conduit for management purposes.
The argument that a mutual fund is a mere conduit is reinforced by cer-
tain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.5 Under the IRC, mutual
funds which distribute at least ninety percent of their net investment income
(income from interest and dividends) to their shareholders annually are not
taxed on such income. 6 Instead, the shareholder receiving the dividend pays
the federal income tax on it." Likewise, the IRC provides that distributed capital
gains dividends shall be treated by the shareholders as long term capital gains.1"
Thus, for federal tax purposes, the mutual fund is viewed as a mere conduit, the
investor being the real party in interest. 9
The last argument in favor of the conduit theory centers on the unique
nature of a mutual fund.20 A mutual fund is organized in corporate form. A
In Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Braman, 111 N.J. Eq. 191, 194, 161 Atl. 674, 675
(Ch. 1932), the court held that dividends on the entire stock of the corporation owned by
the testator, devised in trust for life tenants' benefit, was income distributable to life tenants.
The court stated, "The Alwyn Corporation dealt in securities. Securities were its, stock in
trade ... as shoes or hats are the commodities of commercial companies." In In re Byrne's
Estate, 192 Misc. 451, 452, 81 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (Surr. Ct. 1948), the court equated the activity
of a mutual fund with that of a corporation engaged in the buying and selling of real estate.
When such a corporation distributes the profits from the sale of property it is distributing
income and not capital.
13 The conduit theory has received support from a number of commentators. See Lobell,
supra note 3, at 186-88. Lobell views a mutual fund as a cluster of individual service arrange-
ments, its function being the same as a private investment counsellor - a mere conduit.
See generally Ewart, Principal and Income Problems of Trustees with Mutual Fund Divi-
dends, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1025 (1956); Putney, Capital Gain Dividends: Should They
be Allocated to Income or Principal, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 22 (1956); Wentworth, Recent
Developments Relating to the Treatment of Investment Company Capital Gains Distributions
by Fiduciaries, 49 MAss. L.Q. 147 (1964); Note, supra note 7, at 510-14 (1964).
14 The per share value of the fund is equivalent to the net market value of the fund's
portfolio, including both net unrealized capital gains and gains which are realized but undis-
tributed, divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Ignoring nominal management
fees, any net capital gain of the fund results in an identical proportionate gain in the value
of the mutual fund shares. Likewise, any distribution of realized capital gains necessarily
must cause a reduction in per share value which is identical in amount to the per share
distribution. Note, supra note 7, at 511 (1964).
15 INT. REV. 'CODE OF 1954, §§ 851-55.
16 Id. § 852(a)(1),(b) (2) (D).
17 26 C.F.R. § 1.852-4(a) (1966).
18 INT. Rav. CODE- OF 1954, § 852(b) (3) (B).
19 In their treatment of mutual fund earnings and gains, both the Investment
Company Act and the Internal Revenue Code seek to avoid creating any fundamental
difference between the consequences of owning securities outright or through own-
ership of shares in a mutual fund. Thus the Internal Revenue Code does not
recognize the investment company as a separate tax entity with respect to dividends
and capital gains so long as they are distributed annually. Instead, the investment
company is treated as a conduit, without legal significance as far as the assessment
of such taxes is concerned. Wentworth, supra note 13, at 151-52.
20 As a business enterprise the typical fund is unique from the moment of its
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close analysis of the fund's purpose and activities, however, reveals essential
deviations from the ordinary corporate enterprise. As one commentator recently
noted:
The more, deeply one analyzes the mutual fund institution, its genesis,
the expectations and understandings inherent in it, its ethical and contractual
framework, the more one is forced to conclude that many doctrines evolved
to fit the usual type of associative enterprise do not fit the fund. . . . In
inspecting both judicial and legislative approaches to fund problems, we
have seen examples of the ineptness of various corporate concepts - both
of operations and control - applied to the mutual fund. The danger in
that kind of approach is not merely in the harm that it may do, but in
the good it does not do. For the fullest potentials for effective and livable
regulation can be realized only by accepting, at the very outset, the fact
that one is dealing with a set of relationships that do not lose either their
personal character or their essentially personal ethical and conceptual
framework because they are combined in an associative enterprise form.
21
(Emphasis added.)
A striking example of a mutual fund's uniqueness is that it cannot offset its
investment losses against investment income under the IRC.' In contrast, an
ordinary business corporation will always offset its investment losses against
operating income, and only the balance will be treated as net earnings available
for distribution.23 It is submitted that the mutual fund is a unique business
entity and should be treated as such. The doctrines evolved to govern the ordi-
nary business corporation do not fit the fund and should not be applied.
Though the problem in In re Brock involved the nature of a mutual fund,
the court based its decision on an interpretation of section 5 of the Pennsylvania
Principal and Income Act.24 The court sought to determine whether capital
gains distributions fall within the provisions of section 5(1) or section 5(3)
of this act. Section 5 ( 1 ) deals with stock dividends, cash dividends, and optional
dividends.25 The court held that the exception clause in the second sentence of
inception, the circumstances of its formation to some extent foreshadowing its essen-
tial character and its difference from other types of companies. Lobell, supra note
3, at 184.
21 Id. at 216-17.
22 INT. Rav. CODE oF 1954, § 852(a) (1),(b) (2) (D). If a mutual fund wishes to avoid
paying tax on its investment income, which it must do in order to survive in the competitive
field- it must distribute ninety percent of that income without deductions for current net
losses on sales of investments.
23 Brief for Appellee, p. 11, In re Brock, 420 Pa. 454, 218 A.2d 281 (1966).
24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5 (1964).
25 Section 5(1) provides:
Corporate distributions made to a trustee in the shares of the distributing corpora-
tion, however described or designated by the distributing corporation, shall be deemed
principal but if the number of shares of any class distributed to shareholders of such
class is six percent (6%) or less of the number of shares of that class outstanding
on the record date for such distribution, the shares so distributed shall be deemed
income. Except as provided above and in other subsections of this section all divi-
dends payable otherwise than in shares of the distributing corporation, including
ordinary and extraordinary cash dividends and dividends payable in shares or other
securities or obligations of corporations other than the distributing corporation, shall
be deemed income. Where the trustee shall have the option of receiving a dividend,
either in cash or in the shares of the distributing corporation, it shall be considered
as a cash dividend and deemed income, irrespective of the choice made by the
trustee. (Emphasis added.) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5(1) (1964).
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section 5 (1), dealing with cash dividends in general, applies to the third sentence
dealing with optional dividends as well. Thus, the court would make the optional
dividend provision of 5 (1) applicable only if no other subsection provided to the
contrary. It is submitted that the third sentence of 5 (1) is complete in itself
and governs optional dividends exclusively. It was settled law prior to Pennsyl-
vania's enactment of section 5 that optional dividends are to be considered as
cash dividends." Thus, in order for the last sentence in section 5 (1)27 to be
meaningful, the Pennsylvania legislature must have intended optional dividends to
be treated in their own distinct manner, without being governed by the second
sentence of 5 (1) concerning cash dividends in general. It can be argued that the
last sentence of 5(1) was added only to strengthen the previous case law in-
terpretation of optional dividends as cash dividends, and thus the legal implica-
tions are to be gleaned from the second sentence of 5 (1). This position, however,
is -untenable in light of the words, "and deemed income." Had the legislature in-
tended the second sentence of section 5 (1) to govern optional dividends, the
qualifying phrase, "and deemed income," in the last sentence of 5 (1) would
have been superfluous. The last sentence of 5 (1) is clear, precise, and complete;
it does not require other subsections for explication. 8
After superficially disposing of section 5 (1), the court in Brock held that
the second and third sentences of section 5(3)2" control capital gains distribu-
tions of a mutual fund. It is submitted that the court erred in this determination.
Section 5 (3) applies only to the apportionment of dividends issued by the normal
corporate enterprise. It has no application to capital gains distributions of a
mutual fund. ° The phrase, "return of capital," in the second sentence of 5 (3),
26 See, e.g., Hyde v. Holmes, 198 Mass. 287, 84 N.E. 318 (1908); Davis v. Jackson, 152
Mass. 58, 25 N.E. 21 (1890); In re Hurd's Will, 203 Misc. 966, 120 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1953);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRuSTS § 236(c) (1959); BOGERT, Op. cit. supra note 8, § 846;
3 ScoTT, TRuSTS § 236.4 (2d ed. 1956); Annot, 44 A.L.R.2d 1286 (1955).
27 Where the trustee shall have the option of receiving a dividend, either in cash or
in the shares of the distributing corporation, it shall be considered as a cash dividend
and deemed income, irrespective of the choice made by the trustee. (Emphasis
added.) See note 25 supra.
28 In In re Gardner's Trust, 266 Minn. 127, 123, N.W.2d 69 (1963), the decision was
based on a provision of a Minnesota statute [MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501.47(4) (Supp. 1965)]
which is substantially the same as the last sentence in § 5(1) of the Pennsylvania Principal
and Income Act. In Summerfield Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 526, 529 (Orphans' Ct. 1962),
the court stated in dictum: "The provisions of section 5(1) of the [Pennsylvania] Principal
and Income Act are clear and unequivocal."
29 Section 5(3) provides:
Where the assets of a corporation are liquidated, wholly or partially, amounts paid
upon corporate shares as cash dividends, declared before such, liquidation began,
or as arrears of cumulative preferred, or guaranteed dividends shall be deemed
income, all other amounts paid, upon corporate shares on disbursement of the cor-
porate assets to the stockholders shall be deemed principal. All disbursements of
corporate assets to the stockholders, whenever made, which are designated by the
corporation as a return of capital or division of corporate property, shall be deemed
principal. Any profit or loss resulting from the sale or liquidation of corporate shares
shall enure to or fall upon principal. (Emphasis added.) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 3470.5(3) (1964).
30 In re Gardner's Trust, 266 Minn. 127, 123 N.W.2d 69 (1963), involved a statute
containing sections [MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.47(3), (4) (Supp. 1965)] identical with the
second sentence of § 5(3) and the third sentence of § 5(1) respectively. The Minnesota




means a return of capital invested."- That is clearly not the situation in In re
Brock, as the trustee did not receive a return of his initial capital investment.
The final provision of 5(3) refers to the sale or liquidation of treasury shares,
that is, shares of a corporation's own stock held by that corporation. This sentence
provides that those dividends which represent gains from the sale or liquidation
of the corporation's own stock (treasury shares) are to be deemed principal.
It is submitted that the court in Brock ignored the statute's intended scope and
applied the final provision out of context to mutual funds. Mutual fund distribu-
tions which represent gains from the sale of stock and securities held by the fund
are not analogous to those corporate dividends which represent gains from the
sale of treasury stock.
The policy considerations which the court discusses in In re Brock are of
the utmost significance in the determination of dividend allocation. The Internal
Revenue Service has ruled that when capital gains distributions of a mutual
fund are allocable to the income life tenant, a remainder to charity will not
qualify for a charitable deduction under the federal estate tax law."2 In the
Greater Philadelphia area alone, at least fifty-nine estates, involving taxes in
excess of $3,600,000, are affected by this ruling.3" This tremendous impact on
charitable trusts almost compels the conclusion that capital gains distributions of
a mutual fund be allocated to principal. 4 Another policy argument in favor of
allocation to principal is that both capital gains and capital losses should inure to
the same beneficiary. As the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently noted:
It is argued that if capital gain distributions . .. [are] paid to the income
beneficiary, the trust principal will inevitably suffer in years of losses, which
must be expected even in an era generally inflationary, so that, in effect,
the investment company shares may become a wasting investment. 5
Allocating capital gains distributions to the income life tenant will result in
31 E.g., such as distributions received on corporate reorganization, on proceeds of the
forced sale of a capital asset, or as the result of a true stock split. See Steel Estate, 32 Pa.
D. & C.2d 553 (Orphans' Ct. 1964). In Steel, the court held that the distribution by DuPont
of its stockholdings in General Motors, pursuant to a court divestiture order, constituted a
partial liquidation of the assets of DuPont within the meaning of the second sentence of § 5(3).
32 Rev. Rul. 60-385, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 77. The court in In re Brock noted that under
this ruling:
[Wihere a will creates a trust with income payable to someone for life and the
principal thereafter to a charity and the trustee is empowered to invest in mutual
or regulated investment company funds, the remainder to charity will not qualify
for the charitable deduction under federal estate tax law if, under the applicable
state law, any capital-gains distribution on the shares of the mutual fund or regulated
investment company would be allocated to income and distributed to the income
beneficiaries. In re Brock, 420 Pa. 454, 218 A.2d 281, 282, n.4 (1966).
33 Ibid.
34 The Introductory Statement to N.J. Rv. STAT. § 3A:14A-5, p. 13 (Supp. 1965)
states:
The change in Section 5 of the [Principal and Income] Act [classifying capital
gains distributions of a mutual fund as principal] is proposed as a result of Briel v.
Moody .... Under this decision where property is transferred or bequeathed in trust
to one for life and on his death to charity, then if the trust may be invested in
shares of an investment trust, no charitable deduction is allowed under the income,
estate and gift tax laws. Rev. Rul. 60-385.
35 Tait v. Peck,, 346 Mass. 521, 194 N.E.2d 707, 712 (1963). See Shattuck, Capital
Gain Distributions: Principal or Incore? 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 160 (1949). Contra,
Young, supra note 8.
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the anomalous situation that losses resulting from the sale of securities would
be borne by the remainderman, while the profits of such sales would go to the
life tenant. 6 Since remaindermen have to bear any net capital loss which might
occur,3" it is reasonable to hold that they should be entitled to any net capital gain.
It is submitted that the court in In re Brock could have reached the same
desirable result that it did, without violating the provisions of section 5 of the
Pennsylvania Principal and Income Act. This result could have been achieved
by a fuller utilization of the conduit theory. The mutual fund is a unique
entity. The "many doctrines evolved to fit the usual type of associative enter-
prise do not fit the fund."3 " The conduit theory recognizes this uniqueness and
properly classifies the mutual fund as a mere conduit for management purposes.
The mutual fund is not analogous to an ordinary business corporation and the
doctrines evolved to govern the normal business corporation should not be
superimposed upon a mutual fund. Since section 5 deals only with the dividend
allocations of an ordinary business corporation," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
could have held that due to the unique nature of a mutual fund, section 5 did
not apply at all. The court then would have been free of statutory restrictions
and able to adopt completely the approach of the conduit theory under which
capital gains distributions axe classified as principal.
The conduit theory and section 5 cannot logically coexist. The conduit
theory asserts that a mutual fund is not an ordinary business corporation, whereas
section 5 is applicable only to ordinary business corporations. It is submitted
that the court in In re Brock should have clarified this area of law by holding
that the conduit theory is applicable, but that section 5 is not."' Though the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have erroneously interpreted section 5 of the
Pennsylvania Principal and Income Act, the real impact of In re Brock is the
court's acceptance of the conduit theory.
James H. Seckinger
36 In re Brock, 420 Pa. 454, 218 A.2d 281, 290 (1966).
37 As the portfolio assets decrease in value, the market value of the mutual fund shares
decreases proportionally.
38 See note 20 supra.
39 Lobell, supra note 3, at 216. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
40 See notes 25, 29 supra.
41 This view is expressed in the REVISED UNIFORMo PRINCIPAL AND INcOME ACT § 6.
The REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 6(c) gives mutual fund distributions
their own separate classification consonant with the conduit theory.: Maryland, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 75B, § 6(c) (1965), and New Jersey, N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A:14A-5(d) (Supp.
1965), also have passed legislation granting mutual fund distributions their own separate
classification consistent with the conduit theory, but distinct from such sections as 5(1) and
5(3) of the Pennsylvania Principal and Income Act. The trend is definitely toward the view
that sections such as 5(1) and 5(3) do not apply, but rather that mutual funds should have
their own classification. States that have enacted such legislation are: Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-113(1) (Supp. 1965); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 690.06 (Supp.
1965); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-1006(c) (Supp. 1965); Kansas, KAw. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 58-905(c) (Supp. 1965); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. § 9:2149C (1965); Maine,
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4054 (1964); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 75B, § 6(c)
(1965); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.79(6) (c) (Supp. 1965); New Jersey, N.J. Rnv.
STAT. § 3A:14A-5(d) (Supp. 1965); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-5(e) (Supp.
1965); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 67-509(c) (Supp. 1965); Tennessee, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 35-706(1) (Supp. 1966); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 231.40(5)(a) (Supp. 1966);
Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-379(c) (Supp. 1965).
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